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NOTE
MORRISON AND DODD-FRANK: THE
IMPACT AND INTERSECTION
EMILY R. CHRISTIANSEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many situations where the Supreme Court of the United
States makes a decision with which scholars and members of the bar disa-
gree. Less often, however, does Congress disagree with the Court and take
action. This article is about one such case. In its attempt to overrule the
Supreme Court, Congress instead created a source of confusion for lower
courts. On June 24, 2010, the Supreme Court rendered a decision limiting
the extraterritorial reach of United States securities laws. Since Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd.,1 transnational securities issues can be brought
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (the Exchange
Act) only when the transaction is in “securities listed on domestic ex-
changes” or a “domestic [transaction] in other securities.”3 If the transaction
does not fit into either category, a suit cannot be brought under Section
10(b) through Rule 10b-5.
Morrison changed the course of the extraterritorial enforcement of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.4 The transactional test
developed in Morrison moves away from its predecessors, the conduct and
effects tests, previously used in “f-cubed” cases. “F-cubed” cases are suits
brought against foreign issuers by foreign plaintiffs who bought securities
outside the United States.5 Morrison also changed the focus from an issue
* St. Ambrose University, B.A. 2008, University of St. Thomas, J.D. 2011. The author
would like to thank Tom Joyce, Ted Farris, Marisa Tam, and the University of St. Thomas Law
Journal staff for their feedback and assistance with this article. She would also like to thank her
family and Victor for their support. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the
author and should not be attributed to her employer.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
3. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
4. Id.
5. Richard Painter, Douglas Dunham & Ellen Quackenbos, When Courts and Congress
Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the
Extraterritorial Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2011); Stephen R.
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of subject matter jurisdiction to an issue of merits—in other words, the
geographic reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.6 In his majority opinion,
Justice Scalia focused on the general presumption against extraterritorial-
ity.7 Because, at the time, there was no evidence of congressional intent that
Section 10(b) should apply extraterritorially, Justice Scalia applied the pre-
sumption and affirmed dismissal of the suit.8
The actions of Congress post-Morrison, however, reflect congressional
intent to allow the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) and the
United States government, specifically the Department of Justice (the DOJ),
to bring suits that apply Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 extraterritorially.
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (Dodd-Frank) on June 25, 2010, and it was signed into law by
President Obama on July 21, 2010.9 This law was developed in response to
the financial crisis that began in 2008.10 Congress drafted the provision rel-
evant to this article, Section 929P(b), as a very small part of this overall
reform of the banking and lending industries. Congress worded the provi-
sion as a grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the courts. This was Con-
gress’s attempt to codify the Second Circuit approach used by courts for
forty years prior to Morrison. The day before Congress passed Dodd-Frank,
though, the Supreme Court established that the issue is about the geo-
graphic reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, not the jurisdiction of the
courts.11 Since Morrison was decided the day before Congress passed
Dodd-Frank, there was no time for Congress to adjust the language of the
section to address the actual issue—the geographic reach of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. Since the language of Dodd-Frank does not refer to the
geographic reach of Section 10(b), Congress did not necessarily overrule
Morrison in suits subsequently filed by the SEC or the DOJ. It did, how-
ever, create a complicated issue about how courts should approach Section
10(b) cases—or in other words, which test should apply (the Morrison
transactional test or the Dodd-Frank codification of the conduct and effects
tests).
Several issues arise regarding how Morrison and Section 929P(b) of
Dodd-Frank should be applied, specifically in cases brought by the SEC or
the DOJ. First, there is no clear explanation of what qualifies as a “domestic
Smerek & Jason C. Hamilton, The Long Arm of the Law: Morrison, Dodd-Frank, and the Extra-
territorial Reach of U.S. Regulators, 42 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) Oct. 4, 2010, at 2.
6. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
7. Id. at 2877–83.
8. Id. at 2881.
9. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
10. Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: A
Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in
International Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1434–35 (2011).
11. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b).
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 120 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 120 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST311.txt unknown Seq: 3 11-MAY-12 13:27
2011] MORRISON & DODD-FRANK: IMPACT AND INTERSECTION 527
transaction.” Second, the Court did not establish what happens in “f-
squared” cases where foreign securities are purchased on a foreign ex-
change but one of the parties is from the United States. Finally, lower courts
have no guidance about whether to follow Morrison or Dodd-Frank in cases
brought by the SEC or the DOJ. Although some of these general issues
have been discussed by other scholars, most other articles do not address
how these issues are affected by Dodd-Frank nor do any (at this point in
time) propose language to amend Dodd-Frank. This article addresses how
lower courts have interpreted Morrison, how they have addressed (or failed
to address) Dodd-Frank, and it proposes sample language that Congress
could use to amend Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank in order to remedy the
confusion.
In order to understand the full impact of this provision of Dodd-Frank,
this article provides some background information about securities litiga-
tion with international elements prior to Morrison. Part II addresses the case
law pre-Morrison establishing the conduct and effects tests—the predeces-
sors of the transactional test. Part III focuses on Morrison itself and the
Court’s changes regarding the proper approach to securities cases with in-
ternational elements. Part IV discusses the relevant provisions of Dodd-
Frank and the problems associated with the language used by Congress.
Part V addresses some of the issues mentioned above in cases decided post-
Morrison. The final section provides this author’s proposal for an amend-
ment to Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank including sample language.
II. CASES PRE-MORRISON: ESTABLISHING THE CONDUCT
AND EFFECTS TESTS
A discussion of the effect of Morrison and Dodd-Frank must begin
with a brief explanation of the case law and history of Section 10(b) litiga-
tion involving transnational issues prior to Morrison. The relevant provision
of the Exchange Act for this article is Section 10(b) along with Rule 10b-5.
Section 10(b), the antifraud provision of the Exchange Act, prohibits any
person from using interstate commerce to commit fraud in the purchase or
sale of any security registered in the United States or any security “not so
registered.”12 This is a general ban on fraudulent activities under the Ex-
change Act, and securities fraud suits are generally brought under this sec-
tion. This section itself, however, does not provide for a private cause of
action, so the SEC developed Rule 10b-5 to implement Section 10(b). To-
12. “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange . . . to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
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gether they prohibit the unlawful use of manipulative practices or deceptive
devices in the purchase or sale of securities.13 Litigation based on this sec-
tion and rule led to the creation of the conduct and effects tests—developed
by the Second Circuit and used by many circuits—for securities cases in-
volving foreign elements.14
Before the Supreme Court decided Morrison, courts looked to the
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit for guidance in cases involving
foreign securities on foreign exchanges with foreign parties (or with at least
one foreign party). Courts applying Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act “to
situations with foreign elements”15 focused on “whether Congress would
have wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforce-
ment agencies to be devoted to them rather than [to] leave the problem to
foreign countries.”16 This inquiry developed into two tests—the effects test
and the conduct test. In order to determine whether a court had jurisdiction
over a case with foreign elements, the court looked at whether “the wrong-
ful conduct occurred in the United States” or “had a substantial effect in the
United States or upon United States citizens.”17 Most courts applied the two
tests together,18 and jurisdiction was appropriate if either test was
satisfied.19
The effects test developed first. In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, treasury
shares of a Canadian corporation were listed on a domestic stock exchange
as well as a Canadian stock exchange, but the shares at issue were sold on
the Canadian exchange.20 Shareholders filed a derivative lawsuit under Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Exchange Act.21 The Second Circuit reversed the district
13. “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
14. See infra notes 15–34. It is crucial to note that these tests focused on whether a court had
jurisdiction to hear a case, not whether Section 10(b) applied to the case. This is one major dis-
tinction between these tests and the transactional test developed in Morrison.
15. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975).
16. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Bersch, 519
F.2d at 985).
17. Id. at 192–93.
18. See, e.g., id. at 193; Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A]n
admixture or combination of the two [tests] often gives a better picture of whether there is suffi-
cient United States involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American court.”).
19. See, e.g., Berger, 322 F.3d at 195 (holding that there was no need to consider the effects
test because the conduct test was satisfied); Tri-Star Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d
567, 573 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (“Satisfaction of either test may independently establish jurisdiction.”).
20. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 204–05 (2d Cir. 1968), modified on other
grounds en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
21. Id. at 204.
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court decision, which applied the presumption against extraterritoriality,
and dismissed the case based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.22
The Second Circuit determined that the presumption was rebutted since the
transaction affected domestic investors and markets—the effect on domes-
tic investors and markets overcame the presumption.23 This became known
as the “effects” test. A plaintiff could establish jurisdiction if the nondomes-
tic conduct caused actual harm to United States sellers, investors, or
markets.24
The second test, the conduct test, focused on “the nature of conduct
within the United States as it relate[d] to carrying out the alleged fraudulent
scheme.”25 This originated in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell.26 In Leasco, a British company fraudulently induced an American
company to buy British stock listed on the London Exchange and not regis-
tered or listed on any domestic exchange.27 The British brokers practiced
fraudulent conduct in the United States to induce the American company to
purchase the shares.28 The court looked at the nature of the domestic con-
duct and concluded it was sufficient to establish jurisdiction.29 This general
query is the basis of the conduct test. Courts refined the test in subsequent
cases to also address whether the domestic conduct was merely prepara-
tory30 or directly caused the harm.31
Although most circuits followed these tests, courts applied them incon-
sistently. Some circuits required higher levels of conduct in order to permit
jurisdiction while others required minimal conduct.32 One circuit, however,
22. Id. at 206.
23. Id.
24. Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 125 (2d
Cir. 1998).
25. Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983).
26. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
27. Id. at 1330–33.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1334.
30. See, e.g., Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977)
(“[J]urisdiction is limited to the perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves and does not extend to
mere preparatory activities or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activities
were performed in foreign countries.”); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992 (2d
Cir. 1975) (“While merely preparatory activities in the United States are not enough to trigger
application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located abroad, they are sufficient when
the injury is to Americans so resident.”); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975)
(“Our ruling on this basis of jurisdiction is limited to the perpetration of fraudulent acts them-
selves and does not extend to mere preparatory activities . . . .”).
31. See, e.g., Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“[A]ctivities or culpable failures to act within the United States ‘directly cause’ the claimed
losses.”); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 158, 169–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding a move to the United States “allegedly to better direct corporate operations” created a
reasonable inference that the move was a “significant contributing cause” in investor decisions to
invest in foreign stock, thus allowing jurisdiction).
32. See, e.g., Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114 (focusing on whether “at least some activity designed
to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within [the United States]”); Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty.
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disagreed entirely with the Second Circuit approach. The Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia Circuit stated that it would be better to focus on
“what jurisdiction Congress in fact thought about and conferred” instead of
determining jurisdiction by “divining what ‘Congress would have wished’
if it had addressed the problem.”33 The court ultimately deferred to the Sec-
ond Circuit approach, however, based on the Second Circuit’s “preemi-
nence in the field of securities law.”34
Overall, although there were recognized tests applied in cases involv-
ing transnational securities fraud, the circuits disagreed about their applica-
tion. Perhaps this lack of clarity and uniformity was one of the reasons the
Court decided Morrison as it did.
III. MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK
The most important case relevant to Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank is
the case of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.35 The events leading
up to the Morrison case began in 1998. National Australia Bank Limited
(National) was the largest bank in Australia in the late 1990s and early
2000s.36 Its stock was listed on foreign securities exchanges but not on any
United States exchange except for its American Depository Receipts
(ADRs) for its ordinary shares, which were listed on the New York Stock
Exchange.37 In February of 1998, National purchased HomeSide Lending,
Inc. (HomeSide), a Florida corporation.38 HomeSide, a mortgage servicing
company, manipulated its financial records to make its mortgage-servicing
rights appear more valuable than they actually were.39 As a result, National
wrote-down the value of HomeSide’s assets by $450 million and then, three
Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979) (establishing jurisdiction where a
defendant used instrumentalities of interstate commerce and his or her “conduct in the United
States was in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme and was significant with respect to its accom-
plishment”); Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 526 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that “a
slowly unfolding scheme to defraud the plaintiffs involving the use of the mails and instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce” was sufficient); Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 290–91
(9th Cir. 1996) (“The United States is not a haven for the [d]efendants because . . . they are not
here and have not operated from here.”); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir.
1983) (adopting the test established in Continental Grain).
33. Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
34. Id.
35. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
36. Id. at 2875.
37. Id.; Foreign companies that want to trade shares in the United States can either list their
stock in the United States or issue ADRs—negotiable instruments that are backed by physical
stock at an issuing bank. An investor can exchange the receipt with the bank for the shares of the
foreign company. American Depositary Receipt, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/term.
asp?t=American-Depositary-Receipt--ADR (last visited Dec. 4, 2011).
38. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875.
39. Id. at 2876.
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months later, by another $1.75 billion.40 The write-downs caused the prices
of the common stock and the ADRs to plummet.41
A group of Australians who purchased National’s common stock
before the write-downs sued National, HomeSide, National’s chief execu-
tive officer, and three HomeSide executives in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York.42 The suit alleged violations of Section
10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act43 and Rule 10b-5.44 The district court
granted the defendants’ motion for dismissal based on the lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.45
The Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit affirmed.46 The court de-
termined that National’s actions in Australia were far “more central to the
fraud and more directly responsible for the harm to investors” than its ac-
tions in Florida.47 The court determined that the chain of causation between
the actions in the United States and the harm was very complex.48 Applying
the conduct and effects tests, the court held that there were no allegations
that the fraud had any effect on American investors or American markets
and, in turn, affirmed the dismissal.49
The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and affirmed the dis-
missal.50 The Court made three decisions that altered the future of Section
10(b) litigation involving transnational securities fraud: it focused on the
geographic reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, applied the presumption
against extraterritoriality, and developed the transactional test. Each of
these developments shall be discussed in turn.
The Court began its decision by refocusing the question. The issue
turned into a matter of the geographic reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 instead of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.51 Subject matter
jurisdiction regards “a court’s power to hear a case,”52 which is different
than asking whether Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply to a case with
foreign elements.53 The Second Circuit, and other circuits following its
lead, previously addressed the issue of whether a court could hear a securi-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
45. See In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537, 2006 WL 3844465 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 25, 2006).
46. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2008).
47. Id. at 176.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 176–77.
50. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010).
51. “[T]o ask what conduct [section] 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct [section] 10(b)
prohibits, which is a merits question.” Id. at 2877.
52. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
53. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
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ties case involving international elements based on the subject matter juris-
diction of the court. All of the cases discussed above in Part II applied the
conduct and effects tests to determine whether the courts had jurisdiction
over those cases.54 The Court in Morrison established that the question is
not a matter of jurisdiction but instead about the geographic reach of Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. This altered the essence of how to address situa-
tions involving foreign securities, and this change created much of the
confusion between Morrison and Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank.
The next significant change was the Court’s direct application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality to Section 10(b). The Court stated
that “legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”55 Justice
Scalia explained how the lack of a “clear indication” of extraterritorial ap-
plication meant that there should be no extraterritorial reach.56 The Court
found that there was no text in the Exchange Act that gave any indication
that Section 10(b) was meant to apply extraterritorially. Even though the
definition of “interstate commerce” in the Exchange Act includes a specific
reference to foreign commerce, the Court determined that the reference was
insufficient to make the statute apply abroad.57 The Court contrasted Sec-
tion 10(b) with Section 30 of the Exchange Act and found that Section 30,
unlike Section 10(b), provided a “clear statement of extraterritorial ef-
fect.”58 Since Congress included an explicit statement of extraterritorial ef-
fect in one section, the Court reasoned that Congress could have done the
same in Section 10(b) if it intended for Section 10(b) to apply extraterritori-
ally.59 The Court ultimately determined there was no indication that Section
10(b) should apply extraterritorially.60 The Court stated that since there was
54. See supra notes 15–34.
55. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
56. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878.
57. Id. at 2881–82; EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 251 (1991). There are other
articles that critique the court on this point. The focus of this article, however, is not to critique
this approach but simply to address the interplay between this decision and Section 929P(b) of
Dodd-Frank.
58. “(a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to make use of the
mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the purpose of effecting on an
exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, any transaction in any
security the issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized under the laws of, or has its principal
place of business in, a place within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors or to prevent the evasion of this title.
(b) The provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any
person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States,
unless he transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this title.”
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a)–(b) (2006) (italics added for emphasis); Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
59. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
60. Id. at 2891.
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“no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that [Section] 10(b) applies
extraterritorially, . . . it does not.”61
The final major step the Court took was to adopt a transactional test for
all cases brought under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. It explicitly considered
and rejected the conduct and effects tests.62 The Court identified several
problems with the tests, specifically: the lack of attention to the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality;63 the lack of textual basis;64 the difficulty in
applying the tests;65 the differing results produced by the tests depending on
whether the harmed investors were foreign or domestic;66 and the high
probability that the application of the tests would interfere with the enforce-
ment of foreign securities laws.67 The Court determined that the focus must
be “not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases
and sales of securities in the United States.”68 Based on these conclusions,
the Court established that Section 10(b) only applies to “transactions in se-
curities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other
securities.”69
Overall, the Supreme Court in Morrison drastically altered the ap-
proach to Section 10(b) cases involving securities fraud issues with interna-
tional elements. The location of the transaction, not the location of the
fraudulent conduct or the location affected by the conduct, now determines
whether a suit can be brought under Section 10(b).
IV. THE DODD-FRANK ACT
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
was developed in response to the financial crisis that began in the late
2000s. Congress created Dodd-Frank “to promote the financial stability of
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the fi-
nancial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services prac-
tices, and for other purposes.”70 Dodd-Frank is massive and complex, in-
cluding many titles covering a variety of topics, ranging from regulation of
the banking industry to regulation of the mortgage industry.71 Along with
larger, focused sections, there are miscellaneous provisions like Section
929P. Congress passed Dodd-Frank the day after Morrison was decided and
61. Id. at 2883.
62. Id. at 2878–81.
63. Id. at 2878.
64. Id. at 2879.
65. Id. at 2880–81.
66. Id. at 2879.
67. Id. at 2885.
68. Id. at 2884.
69. Id.
70. This is the actual title of the Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-Frank Act.
71. See id.
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President Obama signed it into law one month later.72 This one-day period
did not give Congress time to alter Section 929P(b) so that it could actually
achieve what it intended to achieve—codification of the Second Circuit’s
conduct and effects tests.
A. The Relevant Language of Section 929P(b)
Section 929P(b) amends Section 22 of the Securities Act of 1933,73
Section 27 of the Exchange Act,74 and Section 214 of the Investment Advi-
sors Act of 1940.75 The language proposed in the initial version of this bill
granted jurisdiction to United States courts in securities cases where fraudu-
lent conduct occurred within the United States or had a foreseeable substan-
tial effect within the United States.76 The language actually adopted and
used in the final version narrows the grant of jurisdiction to cases brought
by the SEC or the United States government in such situations.77 Congress
also included a provision requiring the SEC to survey and report on whether
to extend this grant of jurisdiction to private rights of action.78 This reflects
Congress’s intent to permit private causes of action, like the one in Morri-
72. Id.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2006).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (2006).
76. “The jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States and the United States courts of
any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States described under subsec-
tion (a) includes violations of the antifraud provisions of this title, and all suits in equity and
actions at law under those provisions, involving—(1) conduct within the United States that consti-
tutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs
outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside the
United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.”
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7216 (2009).
77. “The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory
shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the
United States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of [this title] involving—(1) conduct
within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if
the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the
United States.”
Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b) (2010) (italics added for emphasis).
78. The SEC must “solicit public comment and thereafter conduct a study to determine the
extent to which private rights of action under the antifraud provisions of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 should be extended to cover—(1) conduct within the United States that con-
stitutes a significant step in the furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction
occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; and (2) conduct occurring
outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.” The
Commission must focus on “(1) the scope of such a private right of action, including whether it
should extend to all private actors or whether it should be more limited to extend just to institu-
tional investors or otherwise; (2) what implications such a private right of action would have on
international comity; (3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of action for
transnational securities frauds; and (4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should be
adopted” as well as other issues. The Commission was required to submit a report with recom-
mendations by the beginning of 2012.  Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y (2010).
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son, along with SEC and governmental actions.79 This means Congress es-
sentially “commissioned the SEC to review and recommend whether to
overturn Morrison.”80 The language of Section 929P(b) on its face does not
raise any problems. Ascertaining the meaning of the section and how to
apply it, however, is more difficult.
B. The Intent and Effect Of Section 929P(b)
There is very little discussion of Section 929P(b) in the legislative his-
tory of Dodd-Frank—it is mentioned only once in the legislative history of
the bill. Former United States Representative Paul E. Kanjorski discussed
Section 929P(b) on June 30, 2010, just days after Morrison was decided. In
the debate, former Representative Kanjorski stated that Section 929P(b)
created “new authority” in the SEC and the DOJ to bring proceedings “in-
volving transnational securities frauds.”81 He stated that the bill was in-
tended to authorize the SEC and the DOJ to bring enforcement proceedings
and to reinstate the conduct and effects tests in cases brought by these agen-
cies.82 He mentioned the presumption against extraterritoriality applied in
Morrison and explicitly stated that Dodd-Frank was meant to rebut that
presumption in cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ.83 Representative
Kanjorski did not, however, discuss how Morrison changed the issue from a
matter of jurisdiction to the geographic reach of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 or why Congress did not alter the language of Section 929P(b) to
reflect this change. He focused solely on the fact that Congress intended to
extend the extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions of the se-
curities acts to cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ.
The SEC agrees with former Representative Kanjorski’s statements
about how Dodd-Frank rebuts the presumption against extraterritoriality.
The SEC further argues that Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank overturns Mor-
rison in cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ. In a memorandum for a case
brought under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the SEC stated, “in
[Dodd-Frank], Congress effectively overrules Morrison by codifying the
Second Circuit’s long-standing conduct and effects test[s] (which Morrison
has repudiated) for civil enforcement actions brought by the SEC.”84 Along
with discarding the transactional test and reviving the conduct and effects
79. Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, SEC Release No. 34-63174, 2010 WL
4196006 (Oct. 25, 2010) [hereinafter SEC Study].
80. Smerek & Hamilton, supra note 5, at 5.
81. 156 CONG. REC. H5233 (June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski).
82. Id.
83. “This bill’s provisions concerning extraterritoriality . . . are intended to rebut [the] pre-
sumption [against extraterritoriality] by clearly indicating that Congress intends extraterritorial
application in cases brought by the SEC or the Justice Department.” Id.
84. SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Tourre’s Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint at 10 n.1, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Tourre, No. 10 Civ. 3229, 2011 WL
350286 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2010).
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tests in cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ, the SEC also claims that
Dodd-Frank “codified the long-standing appellate court interpretation of the
law . . . by . . . providing that the inquiry is one of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.”85 In light of these statements, not only does the SEC disregard the
transactional test developed by the Supreme Court, but it also disregards the
entire shift in perspective regarding whether the issue is about jurisdiction
or geographic reach in cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ.
Despite some evidence of Congress’s intent, it is still unclear how Sec-
tion 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank actually impacts the application of Morrison in
cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ. The provision was drafted based on
the approach of the Second Circuit, which was the leading approach for
forty years until the day before Congress passed Dodd-Frank. The Supreme
Court changed the approach when it was too late for Congress to alter the
provision. Even though the language of Section 929P(b) does not necessa-
rily address the substantive reach of Section 10(b), there is now some evi-
dence of congressional intent for Section 10(b) to apply extraterritorially in
cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ.
Now that Congress has attempted to establish that Section 10(b)
should apply extraterritorially, should Morrison be disregarded in cases in-
volving the SEC or the DOJ? Even if Congress’s intent is clear, does the
jurisdictional focus of Section 929P(b) render the intent ineffectual? These
questions have yet to be answered. At this point, the only inference that can
be drawn from Section 929P(b) is that it was intended to codify and solidify
the Second Circuit approach to Section 10(b) litigation in cases brought by
the SEC or the DOJ.86
V. CASES SINCE MORRISON AND DODD-FRANK
Since the Supreme Court decided Morrison and Dodd-Frank became a
law, courts have ruled on when and how Morrison governs and have also
refined the transactional test. Most cases involving Morrison in the context
of the Exchange Act have been decided by the Southern District of New
York. This court, and others, apply Morrison broadly and, with very few
exceptions, have not addressed Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank or its poten-
tial effect. Since there have not been many cases brought by the SEC or the
DOJ since Dodd-Frank was enacted, few courts have addressed how Dodd-
Frank affects Morrison. This section begins with a discussion of how fed-
eral district courts have interpreted and applied Morrison. It ends with a
discussion of the cases that mention the potential conflict between Morrison
and Dodd-Frank.
85. SEC Study, supra note 79, at 4 n.1.
86. Painter et al., supra note 5, at 21.
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A. Interpretation of Morrison
Courts interpreting Morrison have narrowly defined what qualifies as a
“domestic transaction.” These courts are refining the transactional test and
clarifying the meaning of Morrison. In some situations, it is easy to deter-
mine whether a transaction is domestic. For example, a transaction is do-
mestic if shares are issued in the United States.87 Also, a transaction is
domestic where the “manipulative and deceptive devices” are organized in
the United States and the money is controlled in the United States.88 Most
situations, however, are less clear-cut.
As a general matter, courts are narrowly interpreting what qualifies as
a “domestic transaction.” Several courts have held that even if a resident of
the United States purchases stock on a foreign exchange from within the
United States (where the transaction originates in the United States with a
buy order or other method), the transaction still takes place on a foreign
exchange; therefore, it does not qualify as a domestic transaction and can-
not be brought under Section 10(b).89 This issue arises when plaintiffs ar-
gue, for example, that Morrison does not illuminate what should happen
when there is a purchase or sale with both foreign and domestic “aspects.”90
Where this issue has been raised, courts refuse to limit Morrison to f-cubed
cases. They apply Morrison and the transactional test to cases where United
States residents are either plaintiffs or defendants.91 One court colorfully
stated that it was “not convinced that the Supreme Court designed Morrison
to be squeezed, as in spandex, only into the factual strait jacket of its
holding.”92
Determining whether a transaction is domestic requires a determina-
tion of where the transaction took place. At least one plaintiff has argued
that even though a transaction is recorded on a foreign exchange, it is a
“domestic transaction” because it was initiated in the United States.93
87. In re Optimal U.S. Litig., No. 10 Civ. 4095 (SAS), 2011 WL 1676067, at *50–51
(S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011).
88. United States v. Mandell, No. (S1) 09 CR. 0662 (PAC), 2011 WL 924891, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011).
89. See infra notes 90–107.
90. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
91. See id. at 628 (“Morrison foreclosed the application of [Section] 10(b) to any claims
related to foreign securities trades executed on foreign exchanges even if purchased by American
investors.”); In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495, 2010 WL 3910286, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2010) (“Where . . . domestic plaintiffs purchased shares of a foreign bank
traded on a foreign exchange, the Exchange Act is inapplicable.”); Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v.
Citigroup, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 441, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing a Section 10(b) claim by
Norwegian plaintiffs against United States defendants because fund-linked notes were purchased
on a European stock exchange and the Total Return Swap was sold in Europe); Absolute Activist
Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Homm, No. 09 Civ. 08862, 2010 WL 5415885, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
22, 2010) (dismissing a suit where foreign investors sued foreign and domestic defendants for
private transactions in securities not listed on any United States exchange).
92. Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
93. In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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Courts have not found this argument persuasive and have held that where a
transaction is completed on a foreign exchange (regardless of where it was
initiated), it is a foreign transaction.94 The Central District of California
most clearly stated this by holding that such a transaction takes place on the
foreign exchange as if “the purchaser or seller has figuratively traveled to
that foreign exchange—presumably via a foreign broker—to complete the
transaction.”95
In one heavily cited case regarding this issue, the court stated that if it
carved out a rule for a plaintiff’s “purchase or sale of securities on a foreign
exchange because some acts that ultimately result[ed] in the execution of
the transaction abroad [took] place in the United States,” it would simply be
reinstating the conduct test.96 In another case, the same court stated that
“the most natural and elementary reading of Morrison” is “that the transac-
tions . . . must occur on a domestic exchange to trigger application of Sec-
tion 10(b).”97 The assertion that this is “natural and elementary” may be an
overstatement, however, because some of the language in Morrison, if
taken in isolation, could give rise to the idea that Section 10(b) reaches all
transactions where stock is listed on a domestic exchange.98 This approach,
though, has been taken by several courts.
A party’s “intent” that a transaction occur in the United States or the
fact that a decision to purchase stock is made in the United States also do
not make a transaction “domestic.”99 In one case, a plaintiff alleged that a
transaction was domestic because the stock transfer was made pursuant to
an agreement subject to Florida law and the paperwork was sent through the
United States mail, which demonstrated that the plaintiff intended for the
transaction to take place in the United States.100 The court determined that
the plaintiff’s intent did not change the location of the transaction—which
in this case was outside the United States—and since the claim failed the
transactional test, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 did not apply.101 Just as
“intent” does not make a transaction domestic, the fact that a plaintiff was
in the United States when he or she made a decision to buy foreign shares
on a foreign exchange also does not make a transaction domestic.102
94. See Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. CV 10-0922, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. July 16, 2010); Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 625–27.
95. Stackhouse, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1.
96. Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (italics added for emphasis).
97. Alstom, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
98. See infra notes 108–118 and accompanying text.
99. See Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC TurLimitada, 645 F.3d
1307 (11th Cir. 2011); In re Banco Santander Sec.-Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317–18
(S.D. Fla. 2010).
100. Amended Complaint at 3, Quail Cruise Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC
TurLimitada, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010), vacated and remanded on other grounds.
101. See id. at 1350.
102. In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (“Plaintiffs approach—that it is enough to allege that [p]laintiffs are U.S. residents who
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Courts have also addressed specific actions and agreements that do not
qualify as domestic transactions even if they occur in the United States,
such as initiation of a transaction in the United States and swap agreements.
The court of the Southern District of New York held that “a purchase order
in the United States for a security that is sold on a foreign exchange is
insufficient to subject the purchase to the coverage of [S]ection 10(b) of the
Exchange Act.”103 Mere initiation of a transaction in the United States is
not enough for the transaction to be considered domestic. In Elliot Associ-
ates v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, the court faced the issue of swap
agreements. When it was asked to decide whether “domestic transactions”
included swap agreements with undisclosed counterparties who may or may
not have been foreign.104 The court held that this kind of agreement failed
the transactional test developed in Morrison; therefore, Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 did not apply.105 The swap agreement at issue did not qualify as
a domestic transaction because allowing otherwise “would extend extrater-
ritorial application of the Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions to virtually
any situation in which one party to a swap agreement is located in the
United States.”106 The court considered swap agreements to be the
equivalent of “a buy order in the United States for a security traded
abroad.”107 Overall, courts have been narrowing the types of transactions
that qualify as “domestic.”
The second major issue courts have decided is that Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 do not apply to securities listed on a domestic exchange but sold
on a foreign exchange. According to one court, it would be “contrary to the
spirit of Morrison” to hold otherwise.108 In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Se-
curities Litigation exemplifies this idea.109 In Vivendi, foreign and domestic
purchasers of foreign securities on a foreign exchange claimed the transac-
tional test was satisfied because the securities were also listed on a domestic
exchange.110 The court did not find the argument persuasive and stated that
there was “no indication that the Morrison majority read Section 10(b) as
applying to securities that may be cross-listed on domestic and foreign ex-
changes, but where the purchase and sale [did] not arise from the domestic
were in the country when they decided to buy RBS shares—is exactly the type of analysis that
Morrison seeks to prevent.”).
103. Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d
166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
104. See 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
105. Id. at 476.
106. Id. at 474.
107. Roger W. Kirby, Access to United States Courts by Purchasers of Foreign Listed Securi-
ties in the Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 223, 254
(2011).
108. Royal Bank of Scot., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
109. See 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
110. Id. at 527.
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listing.”111 The court threw out a jury verdict worth over nine billion dollars
because the transactional test was not satisfied.112
In Sgalambo v. McKenzie, stock of a company, Canadian Superior,
was traded on both the Toronto Stock Exchange and the American Stock
Exchange.113 When a class action was filed, the plaintiffs argued that since
the stock was listed on the American Stock Exchange, the transactional test
was satisfied even though the actual purchase occurred on the Toronto
Stock Exchange.114 The court disagreed, finding instead that Morrison and
the transactional test foreclosed “any potential class members who pur-
chased Canadian Superior common stock on a foreign exchange.”115 In a
similar case, the court stated that “the idea that a foreign company is subject
to U.S. Securities laws everywhere it conducts foreign transactions merely
because it has ‘listed’ some securities in the United States” is against what
Morrison represents.116 The court emphasized that the focus must be on the
“territorial location where the purchase or sale was executed” instead of
where the stock was listed.117 This issue arose in Morrison as well where
National’s ADRs, which were listed on a United States exchange, did not
satisfy the transactional test.118 These cases reflect a narrow interpretation
of what qualifies as a “domestic transaction.”
B. Post-Morrison Cases Discussing Dodd-Frank
There have been very few cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ since
Morrison that raise the applicability of Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank at
this time. For this reason, courts have not directly addressed the intersection
of Morrison and Dodd-Frank. There have, however, been a few cases that
mention Dodd-Frank, but none of them explain how Dodd-Frank applies in
cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ. In one case brought by the SEC, the
relevant transactions qualified as domestic transactions so the SEC did not
need to raise the issue of whether Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank ap-
plied.119 The same situation occurred in a case brought by the DOJ. Since
the transactions were considered domestic, the court did not need to deter-
mine “the applicability of the recent Congressional amendment to the Se-
curities Exchange Act, made in the wake of the Morrison decision.”120 In
111. Id. at 531.
112. Id. at 587.
113. 739 F. Supp. 2d 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 487.
116. In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
117. Id.
118. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
119. See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 738 F. Supp. 2d 376 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
120. United States v. Mandell, No. (S1) 09 CR. 0662 (PAC), 2011 WL 924891, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011).
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both of these cases there was no need to address whether Section 10(b)
applied extraterritorially because the transactions satisfied the transactional
test.
In another case, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York stated: “[I]n legislation recently enacted, Congress explicitly granted
federal courts extraterritorial jurisdiction under the conduct [and] effect[s]
test[s] for proceedings brought by the SEC, and called for further SEC
study and report on the issue in regard to extraterritorial private rights of
action.”121 The court, however, did not delve further into the impact of the
provision on the case, nor did it analyze whether courts should take the
provision into consideration before applying the transactional test in cases
brought by the SEC or the DOJ.
In a Florida case, the court distinguished Morrison from the SEC case
at issue and assumed that “[Morrison’s] holding [was] still good law after
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act.”122 The court, however, did not discuss how the two apply to-
gether or what it meant by “still good law.”
In a case brought by the DOJ in Kentucky, the court refused to dismiss
the case based on Morrison until after the government could present its
case-in-chief regarding whether the transactions at issue were domestic as
well as “the possible application of [Dodd-Frank], which extends the reach
of the jurisdiction of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws with
respect to actions brought by the United States.”123 With this statement the
court acknowledged that Morrison did not necessarily require dismissal if
the transactions were not domestic and the court recognized that it needed
to consider Dodd-Frank.
As discussed above, courts have not determined how Morrison and
Dodd-Frank interact because they have not needed to do so. There have
been few cases filed by the SEC or the DOJ involving this issue since Mor-
rison, and the few cases that were filed involved domestic transactions. Be-
cause of this, courts have not needed to consider the extraterritorial reach of
Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. As the SEC and the DOJ bring more cases
where the relevant transactions are not clearly domestic, courts will have to
address how Morrison and Dodd-Frank interact. There is, however, at least
some acknowledgement that neither Morrison nor Dodd-Frank can be
wholly disregarded in cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ.
121. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 627 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
122. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Lauer, No. 03-80612, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141441, at *9
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2010).
123. United States v. Coffman, 771 F. Supp. 2d 735, 737–38 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
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VI. WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
At this point, there is no consensus about how Dodd-Frank affects
Morrison or the transactional test. Courts thus far have not explicitly held
that Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank overrules Morrison in cases brought by
the SEC or the DOJ nor have courts reached a decision about how to apply
the two together.124 The issue that will arise in the near future is how to
address Morrison in light of Dodd-Frank in cases brought by the SEC or the
DOJ. Lower courts will be faced with such cases where the transactions will
not be considered “domestic” and will therefore need to determine whether
to follow the Morrison transactional test or whether to follow the congres-
sional intent reflected in Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank. There are a few
arguments that the SEC and the DOJ can raise and several ways the issue
could be resolved, but the best method for a definitive resolution is for
Congress to amend Dodd-Frank.
First, the SEC or the DOJ could argue that courts are misinterpreting
Morrison. Some of the arguments plaintiffs are making (specifically regard-
ing transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges but sold else-
where) are not so implausible.125 The language of Morrison explicitly states
that Section 10(b) extends to any transaction that “involves a security listed
on a domestic exchange.”126 This was repeated several times in the Morri-
son opinion. If courts disagree with what some district courts have said thus
far and determine that listing on a domestic exchange satisfies the transac-
tional test, it would open up a path, albeit slight, for SEC and DOJ actions
where a security is listed on both a foreign exchange and a domestic
exchange.
Judges have explained, and scholars agree, however, that the transac-
tional test developed in Morrison focuses on the location of the transaction
at issue, not where the stock is listed.127 Richard Painter and his colleagues
argue that the Supreme Court unequivocally held that Section 10(b) does
not apply extraterritorially and listing stock on a domestic exchange was
clearly not what the Court envisioned falling under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.128 Several courts agree with this assertion, and it is unlikely that
other district courts or appellate courts will assert that foreign securities
listed on domestic exchanges but sold on foreign exchanges satisfy the
transactional test. Lower courts are probably interpreting Morrison in the
way the Supreme Court intended.
A more interesting issue is what will happen if a case involving the
extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 gets back to the
124. See supra Part V.
125. Id.
126. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).
127. See supra Part V.
128. Painter et al., supra note 5, at 10.
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Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Morrison regarding why
Section 10(b) should not apply extraterritorially focused on the lack of con-
gressional intent that it should apply extraterritorially—the lack of an indi-
cation of extraterritorial application meant there was none.129 Now
plaintiffs can argue—and the SEC and the DOJ will argue—that there is
congressional intent reflecting a desire for Section 10(b) to apply extraterri-
torially in cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ.
If this issue makes it in front of the Supreme Court again, there are two
ways the Court could address it. First, the Court could acknowledge Section
929P(b) of Dodd-Frank, including the intent behind it, and apply Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 extraterritorially in SEC or DOJ enforcement actions.
The Court may determine that even though the language specifically refers
to jurisdiction, it still clearly reflects congressional intent to allow Section
10(b) suits in SEC or DOJ actions involving foreign transactions in foreign
securities.130 The Court may find that former Representative Kanjorski’s
statements in the congressional debate demonstrate that Section 929P(b)
was created to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality in transna-
tional securities fraud cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ.131 Elizabeth
Jacobs, the Deputy Director of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Office of International Affairs, expressed this idea by stating: “Congress
has now spoken. . . . [I]f Congress’s intention was one factor—at least that
has been answered.”132 This means that the “legal presumption” the Court
relied on in Morrison can no longer uphold the decision.133 If the Court
agrees that congressional intent requires reconsideration of Morrison in
cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ, it may eliminate the transactional test
and return to the conduct and effects tests in such cases (since the transac-
tional test would continue to preclude suits that should be permitted). De-
pending on the results of the survey required by Section 929Y of Dodd-
Frank, this approach could eventually extend to private actions as well.
The Court, however, could instead address this issue as it already has:
there is still no clear evidence of congressional intent regarding the substan-
tive reach of Section 10(b) and, in turn, Rule 10b-5.134 Section 929P(b)
limits itself to establishing the jurisdiction of extraterritorial claims in SEC
and DOJ actions but does not refer to the substantive or geographic reach of
Section 10(b). The Court could determine that if Congress intended for this
provision to overrule Morrison in SEC or DOJ actions, it would have al-
tered the language to reflect the substantive reach of the antifraud provi-
129. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–81.
130. Smerek & Hamilton, supra note 5, at 4.
131. 156 CONG. REC. H5233 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski).
132. Yin Wilczek, SEC Maintains Reform Act Reverses Morrison Ruling for Enforcement
Purposes, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 49 (2011).
133. Smerek & Hamilton, supra note 5, at 4.
134. Id.; Painter et al., supra note 5, at 24.
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sions. Since the language regarding jurisdiction remains, the Court may
determine that Congress did not provide clear evidence of its intent to ex-
tend the substantive reach of Section 10(b) in SEC or DOJ actions. If this is
the case, the Court could find that former Representative Kanjorski’s state-
ments were his personal interpretation of the provision. No other represen-
tative or senator specifically addressed this section in any debate or report,
so his statements are not directly supported by anything else in the legisla-
tive history of the bill. Although the Court would not ignore clear congres-
sional intent, the intent is not necessarily clear in this situation. If the Court
ruled as it did in Morrison in a future case, the SEC and the DOJ would be
prevented from bringing suits that fail to satisfy the transactional test.
Because there is no way to predict how the Supreme Court will resolve
this conflict, Congress should amend Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank. If
Congress chooses to amend this provision, it should use language that
reaches the substance of the antifraud provisions, specifically Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act. Since the Supreme Court has already stated that Sec-
tion 30(b) of the Exchange Act refers to its extraterritorial application,135
Congress should use similar language to amend Section 929P(b) of Dodd-
Frank. Congress should amend the section to say:
In an action or proceeding, in law or in equity, brought or insti-
tuted by the Commission or the United States alleging a violation
of the antifraud provisions of this title, the district courts of the
United States and the United States courts of any Territory shall
have jurisdiction, and the antifraud provisions of this title shall
apply, to any person insofar as it transacts a business in securi-
ties involving—(1) conduct within the United States that consti-
tutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and in-
volves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside the
United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the
United States.136
This incorporates language from Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act
that the Supreme Court has already determined establishes extraterritoriality
and maintains the test established by Congress. If Congress amends the lan-
guage of Section 929P(b) to reflect the substantive reach of the antifraud
provisions, congressional intent would be clear and the Supreme Court
would have to apply the conduct and effects tests (as described in this pro-
vision) in cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ.
VII. CONCLUSION
The extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is
in flux. Although the Supreme Court issued a decision stating that this pro-
135. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882 (2010).
136. The italicized portions reflect the altered language.
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vision does not apply extraterritorially, that decision was based on the lack
of congressional intent that it should apply extraterritorially. The Court held
that as a matter of the geographic reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a
plaintiff can bring a claim under the section or rule only if the transactions
at issue are “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges [or]
domestic transactions in other securities.”137 In Dodd-Frank, however, Con-
gress demonstrated that it intended for Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to
apply extraterritorially in cases brought by the SEC or the United States
government. Since Congress used language regarding jurisdiction instead of
language regarding the substantive reach of Section 10(b), Dodd-Frank
does not definitively overrule Morrison in SEC or DOJ cases. Courts that
have addressed transnational securities fraud issues since Morrison have not
explicitly focused on whether Dodd-Frank affects the Morrison holding in
cases brought by the SEC or the DOJ. Not many SEC or DOJ actions have
raised this issue, but it will arise in the future.
Because Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank is unclear (and perhaps inef-
fective), there is no way to determine how the Supreme Court will address
this issue when faced with it again. The best way for Congress to ensure
that courts respect its intent is for Congress to amend Section 929P(b) of
Dodd-Frank. It should specify that in SEC or DOJ enforcement actions in-
volving transnational securities fraud, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 geo-
graphically reach the transactions if there is relevant fraudulent conduct in
the United States or there is foreseeable substantial harm to the United
States. This resolution will benefit Congress and provide guidance for lower
courts.
137. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
